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Introduction
The aim of the present paper is twofold. Firstly, it will attempt to describe the content, the 
extent and the intentions that form the relation which according to Proclus ought to be 
developed between the educator and the receiver of education. Secondly, it will present 
the methodological steps through which all of the above must be articulated and realized 
according to the philosopher. The text used in this study is the commentary of Proclus on 
the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades I, whose subject is the beginning of the communication 
between Socrates and Alcibiades. The Neoplatonic philosopher finds in this communica-
tion more than one meaning of educational relation. He reveals critical anthropological 
and existential aims guided, additionally, by divine and metaphysical inspirations. More 
specifically, the question is how Alcibiades as a student will be able to reveal the deepest 
cores of his existence, his spiritual potential, his ethical foundations, and his real interests 
in life. At the same time, though, the philosopher estimates that the ultimate target for 
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Alcibiades is not only to be guided to self-knowledge, but also to realize the orientation 
which gives an essential meaning to the human course. The following parts of this study 
present Proclus’ references to the criteria that Socrates fulfils as an educator and as a lover, 
in order to approach Alcibiades through the terms of high anthropological deontology. 
This is a course whose culmination is located in the divine spirit, which, as an expression 
of the divine providence, offers to man the integrity and the diachronic of the objective 
values. Inspired, thus, by divine interventions, Socrates becomes a ‘divinely inspired’ 
lover and educator. Regarding all the aforementioned aspects, Proclus refers to certain 
general educational positions, using always Socrates as a cause and as a starting point.1 
The attributes of the Divine and Vulgar Lover (46, 14–49, 15)
Having examined within a general frame the issues regarding the communication on 
love matters, Proclus continues by beginning to research two specific issues referring to 
the communication between Socrates and Alcibiades. Firstly, he enquires into the cause 
of wonder of Alcibiades regarding the zeal of Socrates to remain close to him, retaining 
in his position all the pure characteristics of love when all of the other lovers have left. 
Secondly, he examines how the Athenian dialectic perceives the intellectual condition of 
the politically ambitious young man. These questions are systematically set to be exam-
ined using as a cause the evaluation of the human criteria, which, as presented by the 
Neoplatonic philosopher, are not always characterized by an austere analysis.  
In the beginning, it is noted that the less perfect persons are accustomed to evaluate 
their efforts and the activities of their internal world according to their duration and 
not according to the perfection of their quality. They lay, therefore emphasis on quanti-
tative criteria rather than on intellectual and creative ones. Thus, the following simple 
remark in the form of a rhetoric question is set immediately after: Is it not easily ascer-
tained that many invite someone who has disposed enough time in the company of teach-
ers, a skilled craftsman or a specialized scientist – an expert for matters with which he 
has dealt with extensively? The following remark is of a critical order and proceeds into 
further evaluative categorization pointing out, in a reversed comparison to the previous 
concept, the argument that it is not surprising that a cleverer person requires less time 
and effort in order to achieve the completeness of his self. Still, those who do not possess 
the capability to judge the form as such, i.e. the authentic condition, and the tendency of 
a person towards a specific conquest, consider their time to have been given by nature 
as an adequate evidence of effectiveness.2 Due to this fact, that the majority has the habit 
1  For the content of the Alcibiades I, see the extensive introduction of Segonds (1985: VII–CXXXIX), where 
the relevant commendatory tradition with reference to this platonic dialogue is presented analytically. See also 
Bastid (1969: 35–44).
2  Cf. Procl. In Alc. I 47, 1–4: “Καίτοι θαυμαστòν οὐδὲν τὸν εὐφυέστερον / ἐλάττονος δεδεῇσθαι χρόνου καὶ 
πραγματείας εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελείωσιν· ἀλλ’  ὅμως οἱ τò εἶδος  αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν ἔξιν μἠ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν 
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of judging every circumstance in this manner, by dire necessity Alcibiades as well would 
wonder about the duration of the love of Socrates, as to what the latter is in its origins. In 
other words, must the duration be evaluated in quantitative or qualitative criteria? This 
is a problem that occurs from the comparison of the Athenian dialectic with the other 
lovers of Alcibiades. Furthermore, it is pointed out that there can be no doubt that the 
Athenian philosopher, knowing the young age of Alcibiades, would aim to explain to him 
his query regarding the reason for which he clearly expressed in the present moment for 
the first time his providence, and retained for an extensive period of time a loving interest 
towards him. At this point, in a way, we would propound a pedagogical strategy, which is 
immediately connected to the specific – in terms of the realistically qualitative – moment 
of the expression of the personal reference.
Proclus, then, shifts his investigations to general matters of ethical reference. He 
examines for which reasons the intemperate could never make himself worthy of the 
epithet prudent (moderate), the unjust – of the epithet just, and the coward – of the 
epithet brave.   More specifically, he emphasizes the reasons that make it impossible for 
the same person to receive at the same time two different attributes. Such a double char-
acterization would obviously be contradictory and would, thereby, create problems in the 
evaluative process. It is also noted, that the annoying (vulgar) regarding their love-affair 
issues and also those who have never attained in the correct sense such an attribute desire 
to be called lovers and to participate in the characterization of this divine condition. The 
same is valid for those having a different target in life and, moreover, for those adopting 
a hostile behavior towards those possessing the above mentioned attribute. Here, Proclus 
notes the specific distinction that exists between the two attitudes referring to love issues. 
On the one hand, the divine lovers guide their beloved ones to the divine and to the in 
any given aspect illuminant and one-like in nature, while the others, the vulgar ones, 
guide the souls of their beloved ones to the godless, dark and fragmental.3 The dialectical 
contradiction is here evident through terms of an extreme confrontation which is also 
irreconcilable. These are two completely different existential horizons that refer to two 
different anthropological paradigms.
According to the Neoplatonic philosopher, the cause of the above discussed differ-
ence lies in the fact that the aim and the habits of the intemperate one are complete-
ly different from those of the prudent one. Certainly, all lovers have the same aim, e.g. 
becoming familiar with the beautiful. But the forgetfulness and the ignorance of the 
primarily beautiful lead the vicious-inferior lovers to the material kind of beauty, which 
entails their degeneration as lovers. The deviation is, thus, also based on specific episte-
mological deficits. Therefore, the lowest beauty possesses the same name as the primarily 
ἀποχρῶν οἴονται κριτήριον  ἑαυτοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως δεδόσθαι τὸν χρόνον.
3  Cf. Procl In Alc. I 48, 2–5: Οἱ μέν γε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ φανόν καὶ τὸ ἑνοειδὲς ἀνατείνουσι τοὺς 
ἐρωμένους, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινὸν καὶ τὸ σκεδαστὸν κατασπῶσιν αὐτῶν τὰς ψυχάς. See also Pl. 
Phdr. 256 d 8 and Procl. Plat. Theol. I 107, 17.
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and at a superior grade beholder of this attribute, even though it has been deprived of 
its original nature, for the beauty is to be found in the form, while its deviation is mixed 
with the non-form and the ugly, i.e., the inferior lover claims the same name with the 
first, as he is relevant to the ultimate inferior beauty. However, according to Proclus, in 
specific cases the free association between the two situations beauty-love is presented to 
occur as normal through other conditions besides their names. Firstly, it is said that the 
intemperate and the prudent are characterized by completely opposite tendencies and 
actions. And obviously, precisely this difference is the explanation, as each and everyone 
commences from a different ethical, epistemological, and theoretical paradigm. The situ-
ation, though, presents a different image when the discussion refers to lovers. All lovers, 
since they are possessed by enthusiasm (mania), acquire the same experience, although 
they differ as to the superior or inferior kind of enthusiasm, and more explicitly as to the 
manner of their participation in this qualitative condition. The divine lovers participate 
in the pure nature of the love affair communication, while the others in a vulgar one. 
As each of them (irrespective of his reasons and aims) is directed in a ‘manic’ way towards 
the beautiful, he also participates in the same name. The complex way of this enthusiasm 
and the forms of the beautiful certainly diversify the divine from the vulgar lovers, but 
the direction can be characterized as common. 
Still, for Proclus there is also a third argument:  The most divine things due to their 
abundant power regulate their inferior derivations, transmitting, thus, to their hypos-
tasis a certain reflected appearance of their own familiar original property. And while 
prudence cannot act in this way upon intemperance, the divine loving friendship, precise-
ly because of the fact that it is prudent, gives something to its image and transmits to it 
various faint traces. For that reason, the above discussed trace is called an image and 
participates in the same name, because in every case the images desire to receive the 
same name with their exemplars.4 Hence, the principal of analogy can here easily be 
applied along with all its multiple meanings, which are clearly declarative of the differ-
ences in terms of the qualitative and quantitative possession of an attribute. 
The Constitutional Position of Love (49, 16–53, 18)
When proceeding to next issue, Proclus notes that it has already been mentioned that the 
real lover is the divinely inspired one, as Socrates himself advocates, proving himself as 
the only lover really interested in the true Alcibiades. The reason for that is that Socra-
tes is a lover of the soul, as opposed to the those who “destroy each other for the sake 
of a phantom” as Homeric poetry has it (Iliad E, 451–452). The result is that when they 
4  Cf. Procl In Alc. I 49, 7–14: Ἡ μὲν οὖν σωφροσύνη τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὴν ἀκολασίαν οὐ δύναται, ἡ δὲ ἔνθεος 
ἐρωτικἠ θειοτέρα τῆς σωφροσύνης οὖσα δίδωσί τι καὶ τῷ ἑαυτῆς εἰδώλῳ καὶ ἀμυδρὸν ἴχνος εἰς αὐτὸ καταπέμπει, 
διὸ καὶ εἴδωλον λέγεται. Κατὰ τοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπωνυμίας μεταλαγχάνει· πανταχοῦ γὰρ τὰ εἴδωλα 
κοινωνεῖν τῆς προσηγορίας τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐφίεται παραδείγμασι.
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see the phantom of beauty losing its splendor they are guided to other choices different 
from the previous ones. Already in the first sentences, Socrates presents himself as the 
only lover of Alcibiades, continuing to honor his beloved one in a way different from 
the others, and being presented like a ‘daimon’ (spirit), a guardian or god that makes 
provision for him from outside. The reason for this strong presence is that the superior 
in every rank of beings is of one and exclusive meaning, even if there is a crowd follow-
ing it. The concept for the receivers is justified in the following way: this crowd, even 
if it possesses a certain grade of good, owes its acquisition to the unification with the 
superior. If tough, anything is put on the same rank with something not possessing the 
attribute of the good, this last entity cannot be regarded as unique. The property of the 
‘Good’ is the only one considered to be exclusively possessed. Thus, Socrates according 
to the previous argument is viewed as the only authentic lover, superior to the crowd of 
the common lovers: The criterion for this position-assessment is that the latter cannot 
be ranked or have the prerequisites or the intentions related through the perspective of 
virtues-values to the Athenian philosopher due to the dissimilarity between them.5 Once 
more, therefore, Socrates is shown here, under the aforementioned principal terms, as 
the only lover of Alcibiades, a responsibility parameter that even the latter will recognize 
through the realization of his self, and through the separation of the soul from the body, 
which in turn form two distinctive factors between them. Only then, will he be able to 
distinguish the exemplar, the image, and the reality of love along with the false named 
lover which adopts or attempts to acquire the epithet of the divinely inspired one. It is 
the moment when he will be able to specify his definitions and his assessments in a sum 
of conditions, i.e., complicated situations, which he comes across and which he is called 
to categorize into distinctive notional frameworks.  
Returning to the issue of eros of the most intimate matters, Proclus notes that we 
cannot consider this god as worthy of being ranked among the first beings or among 
the last ones. His characterization in the first case is based on the fact that the object of 
love is to be found further than the love itself. On the other hand, it cannot belong to the 
last ones because the subject acting in love participates in the situation that he himself 
creates and, thus, is transformed through its life and presence. Therefore, this god must 
be placed between the object of love and the lovers, i.e., must follow the beautiful and 
come before the ones that express a love disposition. It has to constitute an in-between 
condition. Here, Proclus poses three questions: where did love initially take form? how 
does it advance towards all things that exist? and along with which units (i.e. principal 
ontological conditions) is it transferred into matter? According to the Neoplatonic philos-
opher, it has to be taken under consideration that the hypostases in the conceivable and 
nonrevealing gods are three. He transfers, therefore, the issue to the basic principles 
5  Cf. Procl. In Alc. I 50, 14–17: Καὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης μόνος ἐστὶν ἐραστὴς ὡς τοῦ πλήθους ἐξῃρημένος 
τῶν πανδήμων ἑραστῶν· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τούτοις ἡ σύνταξις πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἢ σχέσις διὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνομοιότητα. 
It should be noted that Proclus presents Socrates approaching Alcibiades in the most appropriate moment. 
For a discussion of the way in which the Neoplatonic philosopher treats this subject, see Moutsopoulos (2003).
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which he adopts for the structure of the metaphysical world. The first one is character-
ized by the ‘Good’, the second one – by the Wise, where the first intellect is, and the 
third one is characterized by the Beautiful, where the most beautiful of the intellectual 
is located, as it is referred to in the Platonic Timaeus (30 d 1–2). Moreover, according to 
theses perceivable causes, there are three units, by cause and unity, existing in the intel-
lectual, firstly though appearing in the ineffable order of the gods: faith, truth and love: 
The first one founds the universe and bestows upon it the good, the second one reveals 
the knowledge that coexists in all beings and the third one assists in the return and the 
union with the ontological nature of the beautiful. This triad is transmitted from this 
starting point to all divine orders and reflects in everything the union with the metaphys-
ical world.6 It is revealed in a different way in each order connecting its powers with the 
relevant attributes of the gods. Therefore, the above discussed specification excludes the 
mechanistic identity. Sometimes, it is expressed in an unspoken, unfamiliar and unified 
manner, whereas in other times it is expressed in a cohesive and connected way. In yet 
other circumstances, it is expressed in a perfective and formative manner, or even in 
an intellectual and fatherly one. Still, in different terms, it is also presented as a moving, 
life-giving and poetical (creational) power, or in a dominant and assimilative way, or 
in an absolute and clear one or, lastly, in a multiplicative and divisive one. Thus love 
extends from the intellectual to the worldly, assisting in this way to their return towards 
the divine beauty. On its part, the truth illuminates everything with knowledge, while 
faith positions every being in the good.7 
For this reason, the gods advice the theurgists on how to attach themselves to the 
god of love through this triad. The intelligible, therefore, precisely because of its absolute 
unification, does not need an intermediate love. Wherever though, there is the unifica-
tion and distinction of beings, love appears as an intermediate condition. In connects 
the divided, it unifies those that come before and after it, it contributes to the return of 
the second one to the first one and it guides to perfection even the most imperfect ones. 
Hence, it secures an unbreakable unity and brings the necessary amendments. In a simi-
lar way, the divine lover, imitating the god that he reaches in his esotericism, detach-
es himself from the superficial of the material and guides himself to the higher kind of 
human conditions, perfects the imperfects and renders effective the aim of those who are 
in need to be guided in their existential completeness. By contrast, the foul lover attracts 
the souls to the depths of matter, misguides them from the divine and pushes towards 
the falsehood and ignorance, filling the soul of his lover with various kinds of phantoms. 
6  Cf. Procl. In Alc. I 51, 13–52, 5: τρεῖς κατὰ ταύτας τὰς νοητὰς αἰτίας ὑφίστανται μονάδες, κατ’αἰτίαν μὲν ἐν 
τοῖς νοητοῖς οὖσαι καὶ ἑνοειδῶς, ἐκφαινόμεναι δὲ πρώτως ἐν τῇ ἀφθεγκτῳ τάξει τῶν θεῶν, πίστις καὶ ἀλήθεια 
καὶ ἔρως· ἡ μὲν ἑδράζουσα τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐνισχύουσα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἡ δὲ ἐκφαίνουσα τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἅπασι γνῶσιν, 
ὁ δὲ ἐπιστρέφων πάντα καὶ συνάγων εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. Καὶ ἡ τριὰς αὕτη πρόεισιν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ πάντας 
τοὺς θείους διακόσμους καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπιλάμπει τὴν πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν ἕνωσιν, ἄλλως δὲ κατ’ἄλλας ἐκφαίνεται τάξεις 
ταῖς ἰδιότησι τῶν θεῶν συμπλέκουσα τὰς ἑαυτῆς δυνάμεις.
7  For the sources of the above mentioned terms, see the comments of Segonds (1985: 151–152).
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Consequently, the latter is surrendered not to the ‘divine fire’ but to the birthing heat of 
the matter and to the darkness of the material.8 In these narrative terms, the contradic-
tions between the two types of lovers, that are dialectically irreconcilable, become clearer, 
as elements of the theoretical and the practical reason are also introduced. 
Divine and Spiritual Providence (53, 19–56, 4)    
In his next argument, Proclus notes that there are mainly two elements in the divine and 
spiritual providence towards the secondary one, in terms of ontological and evaluative 
order: 1) providence runs through everything from the superior to the inferior, without 
leaving even the slightest trace of participation in its projection (image) and 2) it is not 
possessed as a presence through any of the beings that it itself administrates, nor is it 
infected by their nature, or confused with their hypostasis. It is not mixed with those 
that constitute object of its providence (as it is not possible, by nature, for the divine 
and the spiritual to test the trouble of every human or any other soul). At the same time 
though, it does not abandon any of the inferior beings without order and discipline due 
to its distinctive superiority towards all things secondary. Hence, both situations are 
sustained. All things perceive providence which regulates everything, surpassing in all 
aspects the ontological position which these possess. It remains, thus, of good and pure 
nature, putting the universe in order but without relating itself to the things it regulates. 
At the same time, it runs through all things without being identified with any one of 
them. Proclus observes that Plato ascribes this divine and spiritual providence to the 
good willed providence of Socrates towards the less perfect, which, an illuminated teach-
er retains towards the beloved one as available whenever needed for the care of the latter. 
Simultaneously, though, it is secluded, pure and untouched by all those social elements 
that surround him.9
The fact that Socrates was the first friend of Alcibiades when everyone else ceased 
to express interest towards the latter stands as a strong evidence for the guardianship 
concerning the manner in which the young man should compose his life. The fact that 
during his long presence he did not speak to him shows his non-invasive care for his infe-
rior companion, through non-normative terms. As an argument the latter cites the old 
and traditional position: the first contact between people begins with a dialogue. The fail-
8  Cf. Procl. In Alc. I 53, 9–18: […] ὁ θεῖος ἐραστὴς μιμούμενος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ θεόν, ᾧ κάτοχος ἐστίν, ἀποσπᾶ 
καὶ ἀνάγει τοὺς εὖ πεφυκότας, τελειοῖ τοὺς ἀτελεῖς, ἐπιτυχεῖς ποιεῖ τοὺς σωθῆναι δεομένους. Ὁ δὲ ἕτερος πᾶν 
τοὐναντιον δρᾶ· καθέλκει τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς τὸ βάθος τῆς ὕλης, ἀποστρέφει τοῦ θείου, φέρει πρὸς τὰς τῆς πλάνης 
καὶ ἀγνοίας, καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν ἀναπίμπλησι τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου ψυχήν, οὐ τῷ θείῳ πυρί παραδοὺς ἑαυτόν, 
ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐνύλῳ καὶ γενεσιουργῷ θέρμη καὶ τῷ σκότει τῆς ὕλης. 
9  Cf. Procl. In Alc. I 54, 12–18: ταύτην δὴ οὖν τὴν δαιμονίαν τε καὶ θείαν πρόνοιαν ὁ Πλάτων ἐναργῶς καὶ τῇ 
Σωκράτους περιτίθησιν ἀγαθουργῷ τῶν ἀτελεστέρων προμηθείᾳ, ὁμοῦ μὲν ἄγρυπνον αὐτὴν περὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον 
διαφυλάττων καὶ μόνιμον καὶ μηδένα καιρόν παραλείπουσαν τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν σπουδῆς, ὁμοῦ δὲ ἄσχετον καὶ 
ἀμιγῆ καὶ ἄχραντον καὶ ἀνέπαφον τῶν περἰ αὐτόν.
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ure to secure even such form of communication with his favourite reveals the superiority 
of Socrates just as does his refusal of the inferior, without though getting involved with 
further anthropological devaluations.  At the same time, he is both present and absent, 
interested and distanced, distant and close to the youth. Through the return to the major, 
the following question is brought forward: if the behaviour of divine people is interpret-
ed in this way, could the respective one of the gods and good spirits be interpreted in 
another way? The analogies are here clear. Though they are present in everything, they 
surpass it, and though they have offered fullness through themselves to the lowest, they 
do not mingle with their hypostases, and while they are extended everywhere, they do 
not place their existence into any specific territory. What could we assume with regard 
to the myths about the gods who are portrayed as in love with their descendants, e.g. 
Zeus Persephone or Aphrodite? Maybe this love provides and gives fullness to the lovers 
leading them to their coherence and completion?
Bringing the problem of love itself, the question arises whether it is good and pure in 
nature. But here also the definitions prove restrictive. Hence, which derivation can we 
ascribe to this love idiom with respect to the human souls, if we do not consider that it 
pre-exists in the gods themselves? The question is clearly a rhetorical one since gener-
ally everything good, besides souls, owes it cause of derivation to the gods. Regarding 
this argument Plato relates in the Laws (631 b–c) that the exemplars of all virtues and 
corporal goods pre-exists in the divine world, the examples being health, power, justice 
and moderation.10 Moreover, we may assume that the primary cause of love is found in 
the gods and it is ‘offered as a divine gift’ as argued by Socrates in the Phaedrus (244 a). 
Thus, the gods express their erotic reference to the gods but through the following spec-
ifications: the elderly fall in love with the younger in the form of providence, while the 
younger fall in love with the elder in the form of return towards the latter, precisely as 
the providers do towards of the above discussed providence. In the metaphysical system, 
the mutuality forms an ongoing reality through distinctions and through analogies corre-
sponding to each case the particularities are kept inviolate.11
The Distinction between the Divinely Inspired and the Vulgar Lover (56, 5–59, 22) 
When examining systematically the cause of Socrates’ silence, Proclus argues that one 
should notice that in the area of the gods the unspeakable precedes the spoken, the unut-
terable – the feasibly uttered and the silent – that which can come forward through words 
and voice. The negative precedes the affirmative. This concept of justification is based 
10  Procl. In Alc. I 55, 19–23: Πᾶν γὰρ ὅτιπερ ἂν ἀγαθὸν καὶ σωτήριον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ᾖ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπὸ 
τῶν θεῶν ὡρισμένην ἔχει · διὸ καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν πασῶν καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐκεῖ προϋπάρχειν τὰ 
παραδείγματά φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, οἷον ὑγείας, ἰσχύος, δικαιοσύνης, σωφροσύνης.
11  See also Procl. In Rep. I 136, 23–25.
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on the fact that Socrates, having assimilated the divine to himself, declares his provision 
towards his beloved one through a silent position, as the latter constitutes the first appro-
priate element of love, in the same way that it exists in the rank of gods, which in its turn 
is characterized by silence. This situation of negativism and of mysticism is, thus, consis-
tent in terms of time. Hence, the divinely inspired lover is in need of firstly entrusting 
his guardianship of his beloved one to the divinely ‘inspired silence’, before he commu-
nicates with him through words. Because of this, he will be able to assimilate himself 
to the god, and on the other side, he will be able to turn the young man towards the 
question about the silence via which he is attempting to approach him. This action will 
release Alcibiades from his passive condition and transform him into an active person. 
This is how Socrates behaves, while for the vulgar lovers it is explained that they become 
‘mobbing’. The word ‘mob’ obviously signifies a crowd. But this is an indeterminate mob 
that is confused and without order and does not function like the chorus or the demos 
which follow and apply a specific normative order. The basis for this distinction is that 
demos constitutes a group of united people, while mob is a fragmented crowd. This differ-
ence constitutes an important criterion, since in every conversation on constitutions we 
clearly differentiate between ochlocracy and democracy.12 The former is characterized 
by lack of any order, illegality and wrong actions, while the latter is based on laws that 
order various activities in a rational way and compose a reasonable and cohesive collec-
tive system. The vulgar behavior, therefore, reflects a confused and careless kind of life, 
which drags the lover towards the materialized, fragmentary and manifold kind of vari-
ety of emotions that on their own possess an advanced tendency for vulgar conquests. 
In addition, as it is known, the Timaeus (42 c) calls every kind of irrational behavior 
a confused and disorderly mob: ‘a large and later thronging mob composed of fire, water, 
air and earth, a noisy and irrational mass’. Therefore, the term ‘others’ reveals the discor-
dant life of the vulgar lovers. In the same way, the fact that they become vulgar reveals 
the insulting behavior of the many towards the young man, and, consequently, his being 
debased to the fragmented and material kind of life. Moreover, it can be pointed out that 
they not only maintain a divided and discordant relation between them, but also they 
fill the young man with vice and superficial actions instead of using the power of love. 
From a contrary point of view, ‘love sets aside loneliness (estrangement) and through 
familiarity fills in a capital grade people’ as Agathon advocates in Symposium (197 d). The 
vulgar lovers are characterized by division and discord between them, extending, thus, 
the discussed estrangement also to the beloved one. This results from the fact that the 
vulgar is by nature strange and sad, which explains why it cannot acquire any friendly 
12  Cf. Procl. In Alc. I 57, 2–6: Ὁ μὲν γὰρ δῆμος πλῆθός ἐστι πρὸς ἑαυτῷ συνδούμενον, ὁ δὲ ὄχλος 
διεσπασμένον πλῆθος, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις διαφέρειν λέγουσιν τὴν ὀχλοκρατίαν τῆς δημοκρατίας· 
ἐστὶν μὲν ἡ γὰρ ἄτακτος καὶ παράνομος καὶ πλημμελής, ἡ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένη. It should be noted, that 
the distinction between the two kinds of political organizations is interesting but not to be found in the political 
works of Aristotle. 
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relations with the situation in which it intervenes. This is precisely the kind of common 
lover that suffers from vices which deconstruct communication.
In the course of the argument, there emerges an eulogy for the personality of Alcib-
iades in this moment of his dialogue with Socrates when he admits his company with the 
others, but despite their admiration towards him, distances himself from them because 
he regards their emotional behavior as vulgar and distasteful. However, despite his partic-
ipating in conversation with the vulgar lovers, he keeps away from various symposia and 
other distasteful conditions of communication which lead to bad forms of life. Thus, we 
have the difference in the nature of Alcibiades with respect to one of others of the same 
age and the following point is put forward as an argument regarding the latter: when 
we train ourselves to pleasure and pain without avoiding such emotions and without 
remaining completely inexperienced in them, we make sure that we secure the ‘medium’, 
surpassing their excess and disorder – the same can be observed in love matters when 
the superior strives for the integral virtue in the company of vulgar lovers.13 The analogy 
is precise because surpassing the annoyance of these lovers and prevailing against their 
irrationality reveal the power of natural and personal conditions to repudiate flattery 
and life bound to pleasure. With such characteristics of his nature, Alcibiades proves 
worthy of Socrates’ love, as he frees himself from the influence of lover at such a young 
age and expresses his admiration for the interest in the great dialectic. And, as the Athe-
nian stranger (Laws 648 c 7–650 b 4) guides the young to strong drinking, considering 
this tactic a test against their vices and rendering it a judge of the movements within them, 
Socrates presents himself as a regulator of the intoxication that accords to the age of the 
young man, and as a judge not only of him but also of his vices and of the lovers that live 
in an analogous, ethically degenerated, manner. Having ascertained that Alcibiades has 
surpassed all of the above, including the disgraceful, deceitful and devious life of the 
many, Socrates invites him to communicate with him, while also revealing to him the 
true nature of love, the benefit that results from its expression and the aim of the activi-
ty according to virtue, which in its turn directs towards the best ethical conditions, i.e., 
rising to practical Reason.14  
Evaluative Assessments for the Divinely Inspired and the Vulgar Lover 
(60, 1–63, 12)
In the next thematic unit, Proclus repeats that Socrates has provoked wonder to the 
young man through his words due to the stability of love towards him and also due to 
13  Cf. Procl. In Alc. I 58, 21–27: Ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς γυμναζόμεθα καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀλγηδόνας 
οὐ φεύγοντες ἀπὸ τῶν παθῶν οὐδὲ ἀπείρατοι πάντῃ μένοντες αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐν μέσοις αὐτοῖς γινόμενοι καὶ 
κρατοῦντες τῆς ὑπερβολῆς αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἀταξίας, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς γυμνάσιόν ἐστι /μέγιστον ἡ 
τῶν φορτικῶν ἐραστῶν ὁμιλία τοῖς εὖ πεφυκόσι πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν.
14  See also Arist. NE 109β8 16–17. 
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the pure, detached and motiveless providence towards his existence. He argues in extent 
that nothing else could be regarded as more divine in human life than divine providence 
towards the secondary beings, which surpasses any qualification. The property of prov-
idence is to range through everything without losing its self-composure, while being 
present in everything, remaining established in itself. This forms the most paradoxical 
of the theories regarding the content of providence. If we project the issue onto human 
relations, it can be set as follows. A man remains in stable relation to himself, while at 
the same time turning his attention to persons lesser than him.15 Socrates continues to 
astound Alcibiades by combining the cause of human activities with the spiritual and, 
thus, showing himself as admirable not only as a plain human but also as acting in accor-
dance to the spirit that possesses a qualification superior than any human virtue, i.e., the 
spiritual inspiration. Consequently, the love of Socrates is far from that of the other lovers. 
And the difference is due to the fact that they guided Alcibiades to irrationality and to the 
matter, while Socrates lifts him up to reason and to the spirit. Divine love is considered 
to be elevating, beneficent, dispensing of perfection and also causing intelligence and 
life according to the latter. This is due to the fact that ‘one cannot easily find a better help 
to philosophy other than love’, as Diotima says in Symposium (212 b). It is shown, there-
fore, that Socrates, being inspired by his spirit, stimulates Alcibiades to astonishment and 
multiplies his awe for philosophy.   
It is quite consistent for Socrates to act in this way. The idea is based on the argument 
that many similar occasions of amazement attract us to empathize with the good. In the 
holy ceremonies some inspirations that provoke awe precede the performance of the 
rites by submitting the soul to the divine through what is said or revealed. In the same 
way, in the threshold of philosophy, the guide provokes astonishment and wonder in the 
youngster about himself in order for the preceding discussion to invite him to gradually 
participate in the life of philosophy. This process is considered obligatory and applied at 
to major extent in the case of arrogant people. The latter applies because such an attri-
bute is considered to be correct by the mob, although it forms an obstacle for greater 
people. Here, the distinction between the superficial and the normative criterion is clear. 
In order to avoid Alcibiades’ contempt, Socrates quickly presents himself as worthy of 
amazement through the seriousness of his silence and through his spirit of life. Already 
from the beginning of his speech, the teacher justifies his staying close to Alcibiades and 
ascribes his silence to a ‘certain obstacle from the god’, the absence of which allows him 
later on to communicate with the young man. For Socrates would not pursue the life of 
love in the best way, if that choice and the premature approach to the young man were not 
15  Cf. Procl. In Alc. I 60, 6–13: Τὸ γὰρ ἅμα διὰ πάντων φοιτᾶν καὶ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι ἑαυτῆς καὶ πᾶσι παροῦσαν 
ἐν ἑαυτῇ μόνον ἱδρῦσθαι τὸ παραδοξότατόν ἐστι τῶν περὶ τῆς προνοίας δογμάτων· τὸ τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην 
ζωὴν δεκτικὴν ἀναφανῆναι τούτων ἄσχετον ἅμα καὶ ἐν σχέσει συνοῦσαν τοῖς προνοουμένοις καὶ μενοῦσαν ἐν 
τῷ ἑαυτῆς κατὰ τρόπον ἤθει, πῶς οὺ παντελῶς ἐστι θαύματος ἄξιον;. See also Pl. Tim. 42 e 5-6.
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guided by the spirit.16 Because love and his interest for him form a work of the providence 
towards the less complete and because this supervision in a detached, pure and superior 
way is regarded as an act more divine than any human way of living, Socrates ascribes 
the cause of the whole of this behaviour to the spirit. The reason is that the achievement 
of perfection for the inferior and the provision for the lesser belongs to the souls as souls. 
As also their descent appears due to the providence for things involved in the genesis and 
due to the care expressed by the mortals. All of the above aim to bring forward results 
with reference to gods and qualitative people. Thus, it is becomes clear that it does not 
suits the gods and good spirits to accept anything from those who are controlled by some 
unethical quality or to allow them to mingle with inferiors, but rather to care for their 
order. And when a human soul undertakes the role, it takes care to be guided by a divine 
or spiritual intervention. Hence, also the spirit acts upon the guidance of Socrates and 
his silence symbolizes the equilibrium, the cessation of the outward deriving activities 
and his keeping away from the bad life.17
Conclusions
The above examined issues form a minor – yet clear for its directions – sample of the 
approach offered by Proclus with respect to the question of the educational love. His 
analyses, his composite judgments and his propositions bring forward a wider branch 
of anthropology, which is here constituted by the mutual meeting of theoretical and 
practical reason, within the perspective of the composition of the aesthetic and esoteric, 
more explicitly of the internal world of a person. Love is not only portrayed as an exis-
tential ecstasy, but also as a potential for the transformation of both the lover and the 
beloved one. Moreover, it is attributed with such a quality that it ranks with the divine. 
The connection of love to the divine providence forms at the same time also a normative 
proposition for the humans regarding the way in which they must compose their behav-
ior, the latter having to be a deeply inspired offering towards their fellow beings. Another 
critical point is that a calm and prudent expression of love is proposed so that it can be 
demonstrated in an appropriate time and in a proper way, which forms a major issue 
regarding the educational aims. The fact that Socrates is presented as an exemplar of the 
divinely inspired lover-educator is a non-negotiable position for Proclus, who argues that 
the psychological preparation of the persons involved is necessary for the educational 
16  Cf. Procl. In Alc. I 62, 16–19: […] καὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος αὐτῷ πάντως ὁ δαίμων αἴτιος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἄριστα 
μετῄει τὴν ἐρωτικὴν ζωἠν, εἰ μὴ κατὰ δαίμονα πεποίητο καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν σπουδήν.
17  Cf. Procl. In Alc. I 63, 3–12: τὸ δὲ μηδὲν ἀπὸ τῶν διηκουμένων εἰσδέχεσθαι μηδὲ ἀναμείγνυσθαι 
τοῖς χείροσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀσχέτως αὐτὰ διακοσμεῖν, θεοῖς προσήκει καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς δαίμοσι, καὶ ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ καὶ 
ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ψυχαῖς, κατά τινα θείαν ἢ δαιμονίαν δόσιν ὑπάρχει. Τούτου τοίνυν ἠτιάσατο τὸ δαιμόνιον, 
τῆς ἐξῃρημένης περὶ αὐτὸν κηδεμονίας· ἡ γὰρ σιωπὴ σύμβολον ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρρεψίας καὶ τῆς ἐποχῆς τῶν ἔξω 
φερομένων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῆς ἀσχέτου πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ζωῆς. The issues discussed in this article form part of 
a general branch of anthropology. For the way in which Proclus composes this branch, see Trouillard (1972).
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good to produce qualitative results. The word ‘person’ is critical, because the paradigm 
brought forward in all the above discussed issues is basically the education of the person 
that is realized through the revealing of particularity as a value. Moreover, all the above 
mentioned issues are connected with the liberal political paradigm of democracy, which 
does not depend on subjective arbitrariness but on the personal-individual reading of the 
laws and their application via collective criteria by every specific person. In our opinion, 
the theoretical propositions of Proclus can constitute a canonic proposition for modern 
age, since they can surpass the regimentation, self alienation and the unconditional asser-
tion of the quantitatively interpreted schemes of production and result. In other words, 
they point to the potential of creating a political organization under the inspiration of the 
Divine republic or under the objective values of the spiritual.      
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Divine Eros and Divine Providence in Proclus’ Educational System 
This study examines the way in which the Neoplatonic philosopher 
Proclus treats an episode of the dialectic communication between 
Socrates and Alcibiades in the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades I. More 
specifically, it refers to how the characteristics and the choices of two 
different types of lovers – the divinely inspired one and the vulgar one – 
are displayed in the aforementioned text. The characterization ‘divinely 
inspired lover’ befits a person who communicates in a pure way with his 
beloved one and attempts to teach the latter the objective values of the 
intellect. By contrast, the characterization of the ‘vulgar lover’ befits that 
individual that approaches another individual exclusively on the basis of 
his external beauty. The first type of lover is presented within the realms 
of the permanently qualitative, while the second as someone who satis-
fies solemnly his subjectivity and his instincts. Furthermore, it is inter-
esting to note that Proclus argues that Socrates, whom he considers 
to represent the very definition of a divinely inspired lover, is inspired 
by divine powers and attempts to act towards to his fellows – in this 
instance to Alcibiades – in the way through which the divine providence 
is revealed.
Proclus, Divinely inspired, Vulgar, Divine Providence, Good, Beauty, 
Lover.
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